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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

provides "the state engineer shall not issue a permit to appropriate
water for the purpose of watering livestock on public lands unless the
applicant for the permit is legally entitled to place the livestock on the
public lands for which the permit is sought."
Argument centered over the meaning of "legally entitled." The
BLM contended that the plain language of the statute authorizes the
State Engineer to issue stockwater permits to the United States as
landowner of public lands. The BLM argued the plain meaning of
"legally entitled" meant that either the landowner, or a person with the
landowner's permission to use the land, was legally entitled to place
livestock on the land.
The State Engineer contended that "legally entitled to place
livestock on the land for which the permit is sought" excluded the
United States because it does not possess either a grazing permit or
lease through the BLM. The State Engineer argued that the United
States, as owner of public land, must issue itself a BLM permit to place
livestock on its land.
The standard of review applied in cases of statutory construction is
de novo. Because statute authorized the State Engineer to administer
the stockwater permits, the court gave statutory interpretations of that
office "great deference." Though the decision of the State Engineer
was not controlling, it was presumed correct and the burden or
proving error fell on the challenging party, The BLM.
In evaluating these conflicting interpretations, the Supreme Court
of Nevada held that for a statute to be considered ambiguous it must
be capable of two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations.
However, the State Engineer's interpretation, that the United States,
the owner of public land must issue itself a permit or lease to graze
livestock upon the land that it owns was an "illogical and unreasonable
construction of statutory language." With this interpretation the State
Engineer exceeded his authority by ignoring the plain meaning of the
statute. On those grounds, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the
order of the district court and remanded the matter with directions to
grant the petition forjudicial review.
ErikaDelaney-Lew

OHIO
City of Hudson v. County of Sununit, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2601
(Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 2001) (holding that a water system does not
pass by operation of law at the merger of townships, and a county may
only sell a water system to the municipality that the water system
services).
Subsequent to the creation of Hudson Township, developers
created and conveyed a water system to Summit County ("County") for

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

the public good, Hudson Township and the Village of Hudson merged
creating the City of Hudson ("Hudson"). Hudson, five years later,
sought declaratory relief seeking control over the water system. A few
months later, the County inquired about possible buyers of the water
system. The City of Akron ("Akron") responded, but Hudson did not.
Soon after, Hudson moved for an emergency restraining order and a
preliminary injunction preventing the sale of the water system they
believed passed by the operation of law to them at the creation of
Hudson. The trial court, the Summit County Common Pleas Court,
determined the water system did not pass to Hudson by the operation
of law, and the County was free to sell the water system.
This court addressed whether a water system held in public trust in
a township is incorporated into a city at its creation, and whether a
county may sell a water system in one municipality to another
municipality. The Ohio Constitution art. XVII, § 4 provides that any
municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or
without its corporate limits, any public utility. Further, the Ohio
Revised Code § 6103.22 provides that a water works system may be
acquired by mutual agreement or conveyance. Hudson allowed the
County to operate the water system for five years without objection.
Moreover, the language of the Ohio Constitution suggests the water
system may be acquired only by an affirmative act. Hudson could have
obtained control over the water system by eminent domain. The
Revised Code suggests Hudson also could have gained control through
an agreement with the County or through a conveyance. No language
suggested the water system passed by the operation of law. Thus, the
court held the water system remained in the County's control.
Regarding the second issue, the court again looked to the Ohio
Revised Code. Sections 6103.21 and 6103.22 are interrelated. The
former addresses the contractual and payment responsibilities, as well
as the party's rights. The latter relates to the transfer of a completed
water system. The court found a county may only transfer ownership
to the municipality the water facility serves. Therefore, the County
could only transfer the water system to Hudson, but remained in
control of the water system because no agreement or affirmative act
transferred the water system from the County to Hudson.
Staci A. McComb

PENNSYLVANIA
Segal v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 771 A.2d 90 (Pa. Conunw.Ct. 2001)
(holding the filling of wetlands and waters of the United States did not
constitute a dimensional variance, and the filling of wetlands based on
a self-imposed hardship was not authorized).

